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I.   Introduction 
Following Glaeser and Maré (2001), a large empirical literature has investigated 
differences in wages across labor markets of different sizes. The general finding of this literature 
is that a significant urban wage premium exists and that this premium consists both of a level effect 
and a growth effect that arises as workers gain urban work experience (Heuermann, Halfdanarson, 
and Suedekum 2010; De la Roca and Puga 2017). The conventional interpretation of this evidence 
is that the urban wage premia result from higher worker productivity in thick labor markets rooted 
in agglomeration economies (Puga 2010; Moretti 2011). The wage level effect reflects a higher 
level of worker productivity in denser markets, and higher urban wage growth that worker 
productivity is also growing faster in thick markets. 
This paper presents evidence that part of the urban wage premium is the result of denser 
labor markets being more competitive. In imperfect labor markets, workers receive a share of their 
marginal product of labor, and the share is higher in urban areas if denser labor markets are more 
competitive. If this view is correct, prior estimates of the urban wage premium may exaggerate the 
part caused by higher worker productivity. 
To support this view, we present evidence from German administrative data that separation 
rates are more sensitive to wages in denser markets, a commonly used measure of the degree of 
competition in labor markets—see, for example, Manning (2003). We also show that the urban 
wage and wage growth premium is considerably lower once we condition on our measures of labor 
market competitiveness. Our estimates suggest that the urban wage level premium falls by about 
40 percent when controlling for differences in labor market competition and the cumulated urban 
wage growth premium after 20 years of experience is about halved. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the data. Section III describes and 
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estimates our measure of the competitiveness of labor markets and shows that denser markets are 
more competitive. Section IV describes our estimates of the urban wage and wage growth premium 
and investigates their relationship with labor market competition. Section V considers issues of 
robustness, and Section VI concludes. 
II.   Data 
We combine two administrative German data sets for the period 1985–2010: the Integrated 
Employment Biographies (IEB) and a quarterly version of the Establishment History Panel (BHP), 
which are both provided by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB). Since the information 
contained in these data is used to calculate social security contributions, it is highly reliable and 
especially suited for analyses on wages and job durations. 
The data on job durations (at daily frequency), wages, and worker characteristics 
(education, experience, occupation, and nationality) come from a 5 percent random sample of the 
IEB—for details on the IEB, see Jacobebbinghaus and Seth (2007). The IEB comprises all wage 
and salary employees registered with the German social security system, in total about 80 percent 
of employment. The IEB dates back until 1975 so that we have information on workers’ 
employment biographies from 1975 onwards. Note, however, that we will not use pre-1985 wage 
information in our analysis because of changes in the wage variable, which does not include bonus 
payments before 1985 but contains these from 1985 onwards. We restrict our sample to workers 
for whom we have complete information on work experience, which implies they were born after 
1960. 
The data on employers come from a quarterly version of the BHP which also consists of 
data from the German social insurance system aggregated at the level of the plant at the end of 
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each quarter—for details on the BHP, see Spengler (2008). It contains information on plants’ 
workforce composition, industry, size, and on plant location at the NUTS 3 level. We use this latter 
information to assign workers and their jobs to 103 local labor markets in West Germany identified 
by Kosfeld and Werner (2012) based on commuting links (rather than on mere administrative 
boundaries). Figure 1 depicts these local labor markets and their time-averaged population density 
(that is population per square kilometer) by quintile along with large cities of more than 500,000 
inhabitants. We use time-averaged population density as our main measure of how dense is a labor 
market though Section V shows that results are robust to this because population densities are very 
stable over time—the correlation between population density at the start and end of our sample 
period is 0.996. 
Although our data contain observations for East German workers from 1992 onwards, 
restricting our analysis to the post-unification period would markedly reduce our period of 
observation and thus the scope of our investigation. We will therefore focus our analysis 
throughout on workers in West Germany (excluding Berlin) during the period 1985–2010, and we 
further restrict our analysis to males to circumvent selectivity issues regarding female employment 
and because female and male workers have been shown to differ significantly in their firm-level 
labor supply elasticities (Hirsch, Schank, and Schnabel 2010). 
Whereas information on job durations and daily gross wages in the data are highly reliable, 
the data include no detailed information on the number of hours worked. Moreover, wages are top-
coded at the social security contribution ceiling, which affects 7.6 percent of our observations. To 
deal with the first drawback, we restrict our analysis to full-time workers. To cope with the second, 
we exclude jobs with wages above the ceiling (though we will also include imputed wage 
observations in a check of robustness presented in Section V). In addition, information on workers’ 
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education stems from employers and is for this reason inconsistent or missing for some workers. 
To alleviate this problem, we impute the missing information on education using a procedure 
proposed by Fitzenberger, Osikominu, and Völter (2006) that allows inconsistent education 
information to be corrected. After applying this imputation procedure, we have to drop only 2.0 
percent of jobs due to missing or inconsistent information on education. 
In part of the paper, we use the share of hires from nonemployment at the local labor market 
level which requires distinguishing between employment and nonemployment as labor market 
states. Consequently, a new job may either start after a job-to-job move has taken place (that is the 
new job is with a plant that has a different plant identifier), or following a previous spell in 
registered unemployment or no spell in the data at all. The latter either means that before starting 
the new job the individual has been nonemployed without receiving unemployment benefits or, 
for instance, a self-employed worker who is not included in the data. While our data do not enable 
us to disaggregate this category of unknown origin, information from other German data sets 
suggests that the vast majority of workers in this category have indeed started new jobs from 
nonemployment.1 Note that separations to nonemployment are ignored if the worker is recalled by 
the same plant within three months. Similarly, in classifying job-to-job moves we allow a gap of 
up to three months between two subsequent employment spells with different plants if no other 
labor market status, like registered unemployment, is recorded in the data. 
The merged data for the period 1985–2010 allow us to set up an inflow sample of 1,782,212 
jobs held by the 575,014 workers. Out of the total sample, 246,401 jobs (or 13.8 percent) have 
right-censored job durations.2 In our sample, the number of jobs varies markedly across the 103 
local labor markets, with a minimum of 1,401 and a maximum of 98,977. We observe multiple 
jobs within a given labor market for most (56.1 percent) of workers. For descriptive statistics on 
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our sample, see Table 1. 
When estimating the urban wage premium in the second part of our analysis, we will only 
use wage observations at the 30th of June of a year yielding a panel of 3,702,677 observations at 
yearly frequency. Again, the number of observations varies considerably across local markets, 
with a minimum of 3,313 and a maximum of 181,248. Notwithstanding, there are enough 
observations in every local labor market as well as enough movers across markets to precisely 
estimate local wage levels.  
III.   Estimating Competition in Local Labor Markets   
As a measure of labor market competitiveness, we use the elasticity of the separation rate 
with respect to the wage, a measure that has been used extensively in the existing literature 
following Manning (2003: 96–104). The justification comes from a model where search frictions 
are the source of labor market imperfections. Consider a firm paying wage 𝑤.3 In steady state, the 
labor supply to this firm 𝐿 𝑤  can be written as: 
(1) 𝐿 𝑤 𝑅 𝑤 𝑠 𝑤⁄  
where 𝑅 𝑤 0 denotes the recruitment rate and 0 𝑠 𝑤 1 the separation rate (both 
functions will depend on other factors though this is suppressed in the interest of notational 
convenience). It is natural to assume that a higher wage makes it easier to recruit workers so that 
𝑅′ 0 and also reduces the separation rate so 𝑠′ 0. We thus assume that the firm can increase 
its labor supply by increasing its wage so that it has some market power. 
From Equation 1 the labor supply elasticity to the firm 𝜀  can be written as the difference 
of the wage elasticity of recruitment 𝜀  and the wage elasticity of the separation rate 𝜀 : 
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(2) 𝜀 𝜀 𝜀  
The elasticity of the labor supply curve to an individual firm is a natural measure of how much 
market power the firm has. Using Equation 2 to estimate the labor supply elasticity would seem to 
require an estimate of both the separation and recruitment elasticity. Whereas the separation 
elasticity is straightforward to estimate (and later we describe how we do this), estimating the 
recruitment elasticity in the type of data we have is much harder.4 
To deal with this problem, Manning (2003: 97, 2011) notes that many models of imperfect 
competition in labor markets, such as Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and Bhaskar and To (1999), 
imply that the recruitment elasticity is minus the separation elasticity, that is 𝜀 𝜀 , so that 
the labor supply elasticity becomes: 
(3) 𝜀 2𝜀  
Intuitively, this result holds because one firm’s wage-related hire is another firm’s wage-related 
quit. Hence, Equation 3 allows us to identify the labor supply elasticity to the firm by just 
estimating the wage elasticity of incumbent workers’ job separation rate.5 
To estimate the relationship between the labor supply elasticity and population density, we 
use a two-step procedure similar in spirit to the approaches used for estimating the urban wage 
premium by Hirsch and Schumacher (2005), Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon (2008), as well as 
De la Roca and Puga (2017). In the first step, we estimate a model for the separation elasticity in 
each region. In the second step, we investigate whether these estimated region-specific separation 
elasticities are correlated with population density controlling for other region characteristics. 
To estimate the separation elasticity for each local labor market area in the first step, we fit 
individual-level separation equations controlling for the log wage and other relevant worker and 
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employer characteristics. The coefficient on the log wage is interacted with region dummies so 
that we obtain estimates of the separation elasticity for each local labor market. Specifically, we 
estimate a Cox model for the separation rate of job 𝑚 held by worker 𝑖 at employer 𝑗 in region 𝑟: 
(4) 𝑠 𝜏 log𝑤 𝜏 , 𝐱 𝜏 , 𝐳 𝜏 𝑠 𝜏 exp 𝜃 log𝑤 𝜏 𝐱 𝜏 𝜷 𝐳 𝜏 ′𝜸  
where 𝜏 is the job duration, log𝑤 𝜏  is the log wage, 𝐱 𝜏  is a vector of worker characteristics, 
𝐳 𝜏  is a vector of employer characteristics, 𝑠 𝜏  is a worker–region-specific baseline hazard, 
and we treat all covariates as time-varying. In Equation 4, the region-specific coefficient of the log 
wage 𝜃  provides us with an estimate of the local separation rate elasticity. Furthermore, the 
baseline hazard 𝑠 𝜏  in the equation is some arbitrary worker–region-specific function of job 
duration and thus encompasses permanent unobservables at both the level of the worker and the 
level of the region.6 Controlling for worker unobservables is indispensable in our application 
because worker sorting on unobservables may simultaneously influence workers’ wages, their 
location, and their job mobility. Furthermore, controlling for region unobservables in the 
separation equation addresses concerns that quitting for the same wage is not comparable across 
local labor markets because of regional price or wage level differences, as permanent price and 
wage level differences are part of the baseline hazard and are thus accounted for. 
To estimate the separation equation, we adopt the stratified partial likelihood estimator 
(Ridder and Tunalı 1999). This estimator allows us to sweep out the baseline hazard without 
estimating it directly, similar to the within estimator in linear fixed-effects models. Hence, 
estimating Cox models with worker–region-specific baseline hazards is viable, and we are able to 
identify local separation rate elasticities—the 𝜃 ’s—in the first-step separation equation with our 
data. 
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The Cox model is thus identified from within-variation at the worker–region level, for 
instance from wage variation occurring in multiple jobs held by the same worker within the same 
local labor market. As the probability of a separation is likely to depend on the wage in this job 
relative to others in the market, it is important to control for variables likely to influence the general 
level of wages available to a worker. We estimate a variety of specifications for Equation 4, 
differing in the controls that are used. The coefficients of interest—the region-specific coefficients 
of the log wage in the separation equation—are hard to report but available upon request. In Model 
I, we only include worker controls: real experience (linearly and squared) as well as groups of 
dummies for education (distinguishing low-skilled, medium-skilled, and high-skilled workers7), 
one-digit occupation, and non-German nationality. In Model II, we additionally include employer 
controls: the shares of part-time, high-skilled, low-skilled, female, and non-German workers 
among the plant’s workforce as well as groups of dummies for plant size and two-digit industry. 
We finally add to all models a full set of time dummies. The average estimated labor supply 
elasticity is 2.43 in Model I and 2.22 in Model II, both within the range of previous estimates 
summarized by Manning (2011) and Sorensen and Sokolova (2020). These numbers imply that 
employers possess substantial, though not implausibly large wage-setting power over their 
workers. 
We next investigate the robustness of these estimates to different modeling assumptions. 
One concern with our estimates is that the Cox models though controlling for worker and employer 
observables as well as permanent worker unobservables may still suffer from bias stemming from 
employer unobservables. For example, compensating wage differentials may result in higher 
wages for high-turnover employers, thereby contaminating our estimates of the local firm-level 
labor supply elasticity. Controlling for both permanent worker and employer unobservables by 
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means of a Cox model, however, is not viable as this would base identification on multiple jobs 
held by the same worker at the same plant. 
In order to alleviate concerns, we estimate Model III that adds to the variables included in 
Model II, the plant wage effect from a two-way fixed-effects decomposition of individual wages 
for our data conducted by Card, Heining, and Kline (2013) that builds on Abowd, Kramarz, and 
Margolis’s (1999) methodology. In Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis’s framework, the plant wage 
effect represents the wage premium enjoyed by every worker employed at a plant and thus 
comprises all wage components stemming from permanent employer characteristics. As shown by 
Sorkin (2018), compensating wage differentials account for more than half of the variance in plant 
wage effects and thus the plant wage effects may serve well as a proxy variable enabling us to 
control for the nonpecuniary attractiveness of employers. 
Card, Heining, and Kline’s (2013) plant wage effects are only available for the years 1985–
2009 and are missing for some plants in our sample—for details, see Card, Heining, and Kline 
(2015). Hence, we fit Model III that controls for plant wage effects in the Cox model on a reduced 
sample of jobs at plants for which Card, Heining, and Kline (2015) provide plant wage effects and 
where we disregard jobs starting in 2010 and treat jobs ending in 2010 as right-censored. We obtain 
almost unchanged results when controlling for the plant wage effect with an average local labor 
supply elasticity of 2.38. 
We also estimate Model IV that includes as the wage variable the deviation of the 
individual’s log wage from the current plant wage effect. It thus rests identification on wage 
variation from the combination of any match effect between a specific worker–employer pair and 
the current wage residual. In this specification, we are seeing whether individuals who are 
relatively well-paid within a plant are less likely to leave. The average implied labor supply 
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elasticity is now about 1.5 compared to 2.3 in the other specifications (possibly because of 
attenuation bias as plant wage effects are estimated with error), suggesting less competition in the 
labor market. 
Having obtained an estimate of the labor supply elasticity of each local labor market, we 
now investigate the relationship between this measure of labor market competitiveness, that is 
minus two times the separation elasticity from Equation 4, and population density in the second 
step. To investigate whether this relationship is robust to controlling for other labor market 
characteristics, we estimate models of the form: 
(5) 𝜀̂ , 𝜁 𝜁 log 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠 𝐜 𝝍 𝑣  
where the dependent variable is the estimated local labor supply elasticity and the regressors are 
log population density (log 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠 ) and other local labor market characteristics (denoted 𝐜 ). 
The other controls are the log employment share of the largest industry in the local labor market 
(a measure of market specialization), the log Herfindahl index in industries’ local employment 
levels (a measure of diversification), the share of low- and high-skilled workers among the active 
working population (to measure skill levels). Note that we center all regressors around their means 
so that the regression constant gives the average elasticity across local labor markets. 
The coefficients on log population density are shown in Table 2 where the different 
columns represent the different specifications for the separation equation. For Model I, the labor 
supply elasticity to the firm is significantly larger in denser labor markets. A 100 log points 
increase in population density, which is approximately the interquartile range across local labor 
markets and, to give one example, the difference in log density between Munich (5.87) and 
Bayreuth (4.85), comes along with a rise in the elasticity by 0.19. 
The positive relationship between the elasticity and density shrinks somewhat when 
11 
controlling for employer characteristics in Model II and for the plant wage effects in Model III. 
With employer controls in the first-step separation equation, the average elasticity amounts to 2.22 
and a 100 log points rise in population density is associated with an increase in the elasticity by 
0.15. In Model IV, the relationship is weaker still though still significantly different from zero. For 
all four models of the separation elasticity, there is evidence that denser labor markets are more 
competitive. This is in line with previous work by Manning (2010) and Hirsch, König, and Möller 
(2013). 
Figure 2 plots the estimated elasticity for the preferred specification we use later in the 
paper (Model II) against population density showing there is a relationship that is not driven by 
outliers. This section has established that denser labor markets have higher separation elasticities, 
suggestive of a more competitive labor market. The next section investigates the part of the urban 
wage premium that can be ascribed to these differences in competition. 
IV.   The Urban Wage Premium 
An increasing body of international evidence has established that workers earn 
significantly higher wages in denser labor markets. For convenience, we follow convention and 
refer to the gradient of wages with respect to population density as the urban wage premium though 
it does not just compare rural and urban areas. The urban wage premium has proved robust to 
controlling for unobserved worker heterogeneity by means of fixed-effects techniques (Glaeser 
and Maré 2001; D’Costa and Overman 2014) and to endogenizing workers’ location decision in 
structural approaches (Gould 2007; Baum-Snow and Pavan 2012). The premium is thus unlikely 
to reflect mere worker sorting.  
The literature has documented that the urban wage premium stems both from a wage level 
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and a wage growth effect—see, for instance, the survey by Heuermann, Halfdanarson, and 
Suedekum (2010)—in the form of a higher return to experience in denser labor markets (De la 
Roca and Puga 2017). We investigate both the level of wages and the returns to experience in this 
section. 
A.   The Urban Wage Level Premium 
Figure 3 plots the average log wage against log population density for our 103 local labor 
markets. The resulting regression line has a slope of 0.034, so that an increase in population density 
by 100 log points is associated with 3.4 percent higher wages on average. This estimate may 
obviously be biased because of a failure to control for other determinants of wages correlated with 
population density. 
To estimate the urban wage premium, we use a two-step procedure similar to the 
approaches by Hirsch and Schumacher (2005), Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon (2008), as well 
as De la Roca and Puga (2017) and used by us for the separation elasticity. In the first step, we 
estimate Mincerian wage equations at the level of the individual worker of the general form: 
(6) log𝑤 𝛿 𝛼 𝐱 𝜷 𝐳 𝜸 𝑢  
where 𝛿  is a region fixed effect, 𝛼  is a worker fixed effect, and 𝑢  is an error term.8 Our main 
interest in Equation 6 are the 𝛿 ’s which provide us with estimates of average local wage levels 
after controlling for observable worker and employer characteristics. In the second step, these 
regional wage premia are regressed on population density and other region characteristics. 
We estimate a variety of specifications for the first-step earnings function (results are 
available upon request). Model I omits individual worker fixed effects and includes only worker 
controls whereas Model II adds employer controls. In these specifications, the urban wage 
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premium is identified in part by a comparison of wages for workers with similar characteristics 
and employers but who always work in different areas. As argued by Glaeser and Maré (2001), 
Yankow (2006), and De la Roca and Puga (2017), one concern with these estimates is that workers 
in different local labor markets may differ in permanent unobservables that affect their wages. 
Models III and IV address these concerns by including worker fixed effects. In these specifications, 
the urban wage premia are identified from workers who move regions.9 Finally, Equation 6 can 
also be estimated in first-differenced form in which case emphasis is on the wage change in the 
year when workers move regions; these specifications with and without employer controls are 
Models V and VI. 
These different specifications for the earnings functions all give us estimates of the wage 
premium for each local labor market. As for the estimates of the separation elasticity, the second 
step of our estimation process is to regress the estimated wage premia on log population density 
and other area characteristics, that is a regression like Equation 5, but with the dependent variable 
now the estimated wage premia: 
 𝛿 𝜁 𝜁 log 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠 𝐜 𝝍 𝑣  (7) 
The coefficients on log population density for the levels equations Models I–IV are reported in 
Panel A of Table 3. In line with expectations, we find a very significant relationship between all 
the estimated wage premia and population density: for Model I the coefficient on log density is 
0.032, very similar to the descriptive estimate of 0.034 in Figure 2. This implies a 100 log points 
rise in population density is associated with a rise in local wages by 3.2 percent. When additionally 
controlling for employer characteristics in Model II, this estimate rises somewhat to 3.6 percent. 
Including worker fixed effects (Models III and IV) causes the coefficient on log population density 
to fall a bit but it still remains very significant. In Model III (IV) without (with) employer controls, 
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a 100 log points increase in population density now comes along with a 3.0 (2.8) percent increase 
in wages. The estimates for the model in first differences (Models V and VI) are reported in Table 
4 and yield a weaker though still significant relationship between the wage premia and log 
population density.  
B.   The Link between the Urban Wage Premium and Labor Market Competition 
Having shown that both the wage premium and the separation elasticity are significantly 
related to population density, we now investigate whether the wage premia can be explained by 
the level of labor market competitiveness. The standard explanation for the wage premia is that 
agglomeration economies raise worker productivity in thick markets (Duranton and Puga 2004; 
Puga 2010; Moretti 2011). There is good empirical evidence that agglomeration economies exist—
see, for instance, the surveys by Rosenthal and Strange (2004) or Combes and Gobillon (2015)—
but the precise mechanisms are less clear, for example knowledge spill-overs, faster learning, or a 
more efficient matching process have been proposed. In many papers, the underlying model of the 
labor market is not made explicit but implicitly would seem to be a perfectly competitive model 
in which wages are equal to marginal products. 
However, if labor markets are imperfectly competitive and employers possess some wage-
setting power over their workers, “wages are … only proportional and not equal to labor 
productivity by a factor that depends on the local monopsony power of the firm” (Combes and 
Gobillon 2015: 283). Wages will be a mark-down on marginal products with a larger mark-down 
in less competitive labor markets. If denser labor markets are more competitive, as suggested by 
Manning (2010), Hirsch, König, and Möller (2013), and our estimates in Section III, workers in 
these markets obtain a larger share of their marginal product, and we might observe an urban wage 
premium even if agglomeration economies were completely absent and there were no difference 
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in marginal products. 
To investigate the part of the urban wage premia that can be explained by differences in 
labor market competitiveness, we modify Equation 7 and include our measure of labor market 
competitiveness as an additional regressor on the right-hand side, that is we estimate: 
(8) 𝛿 𝜋 𝜋 log 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠 𝜋 𝜀̂ , 𝐜 𝜼 𝑒  
We are interested in the sign on the estimated labor supply elasticity and how its inclusion affects 
the coefficient of population density. In these regressions, we use our estimates of the supply 
elasticity from Model II in Table 2. 
Panel B of Table 3 estimates Equation 8 by OLS. Although the coefficient on labor market 
competitiveness has the expected sign, it is small in magnitude and the inclusion of the labor supply 
elasticity has little impact on the coefficient on population density. Taken at face value, these 
results suggest that little or none of the estimated wage premia can be explained by differences in 
labor market competitiveness. 
However, one problem with these OLS regressions is that the labor supply elasticities are 
estimated with error and are quite noisy. Some indication of this can be seen in Figure 2 where 
both the largest and smallest elasticities are found for small regions with low population density 
that one would expect to be estimated with less precision. This problem is likely to lead to an 
attenuation bias on the labor supply elasticity and a corresponding higher loading on a variable 
like population density that is correlated with the signal in the elasticity. 
To deal with this problem, we seek an alternative measure of labor market competition that 
can be used as an instrument for the labor supply elasticity. We follow Manning (2003: 44–9) who 
suggested using the share of hires from nonemployment (as opposed to employment). In the 
canonical Burdett and Mortensen (1998) model, Manning shows that this variable is a sufficient 
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statistic for how competitive is the labor market. The intuition is that competition is greater when 
employers are directly competing against each other for workers which is the case for hires from 
employment but not for hires from nonemployment. Hence, the higher is the share of hires from 
nonemployment, the less often are employers hiring workers faced with direct competition with 
other employers. The outline argument for this is in the Appendix.10 For our purposes, it does not 
matter whether this variable is a perfect measure of labor market competition, just that it is 
correlated with our preferred measure (the labor supply elasticity) and that it is derived from a 
completely different set of statistics so that any measurement error in the two competition variables 
is unlikely to be correlated.11 
Figure 4 plots the separation elasticity against the share of hires from nonemployment in 
local labor markets. The first stage suggests the instrument is strong with a first-stage F statistic 
of 23.38: as it is the same for all models, it is reported in the Appendix. Panel C of Table 3 now 
presents the IV estimates of the wage premia; the coefficient on the labor supply elasticity is 
significantly different from zero for all specifications of the urban wage premium. This is evidence 
that part of the urban wage premium can be explained by more competitive labor markets in more 
densely populated areas. 
The coefficient on log population density is lower in the IV estimates when competition is 
included as a regressor (Panel C) than when competition is omitted (Panel A) though it remains 
significantly different from zero in all specifications apart from Model I. The magnitude of the 
impact of population density falls by about 40 percent, suggesting that there are agglomeration 
economies, though smaller than implied by other estimates and that differences in competition can 
explain some but not all of the urban wage premium. Panel D of Table 3 presents the reduced form 
for our equation. There is a strong relationship between the share of hires from nonemployment 
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and the wage premia and the impact of population density is much lower than found if the measures 
of labor market competition are omitted. 
Table 4 does a similar exercise for the estimates of the urban wage premium derived from 
first-differenced Models V and VI. All coefficients are somewhat smaller but the general 
conclusion remains; more competitive labor markets have higher wage premia and the impact of 
population density is substantially reduced when controlling for a measure of labor market 
competition. 
It is useful to compare the estimated impact of the labor supply elasticity on the urban wage 
premium to what would be expected in a simple monopsony model. In that model, the wage is a 
fraction of the marginal product of labor, that is 𝑤 𝑀𝑃𝐿, so that the expected impact of 
the labor supply elasticity 𝜀  on log wages is . In our preferred Model II, the 
mean labor supply elasticity is 2.22. This suggests we would expect to find a coefficient in Table 
3 of about 0.14. The estimated impacts are lower than this; one possible explanation is the 
suggestion in Manning (2011) that employers can affect hiring not just through their choice of the 
wage but also through their hiring activities. But, our results suggest that the level of wages is 
higher in more competitive markets and that a sizeable part of the urban wage premium can be 
explained by this competition effect. 
C.   The Urban Wage Growth Premium 
De la Roca and Puga (2017) find that additional work experience in denser labor markets 
leads to a significant urban wage growth premium that adds to the static gains from working in a 
thick market—see also the survey by Heuermann, Halfdanarson, and Suedekum (2010). This is 
hypothesized to be because of greater human capital accumulation in denser markets but also 
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because a more efficient matching process causes average match quality to rise faster. 
While it is relatively easy to understand why there may be a link between wage levels and 
market competition, it is perhaps not so obvious why wage growth should also be linked to market 
competition. But, if it is easier for workers in more competitive markets to find other potential 
employers, wage growth would be expected to be higher.  This is the prediction of the standard 
canonical Burdett–Mortensen model which assumes identical employers. However, this 
mechanism may not be so distinct from other hypotheses based on the efficiency of the matching 
process. In the Burdett–Mortensen model augmented with heterogeneity in productivity across 
employers, one would also expect the quality of the match to increase faster in more competitive 
markets. In addition, if there are gains from matching high ability workers with high productivity 
firms, then denser, more competitive markets will be more effective at generating assortative 
matching, in line with the evidence in Dauth et al. (2018). 
To estimate an urban wage growth premium, we modify the first-step wage equation to 
include interactions of a quadratic in experience with region-specific dummies. To ensure that we 
are only capturing returns to experience that occur within a region, we include worker–region fixed 
effects in this model, meaning that the level of the urban wage premium cannot be identified in 
these specifications.12 However, the coefficients on the interactions with experience provide us 
with estimates of experience–wage profiles that are specific to each local labor market. We then 
regress these estimated coefficients on population density, our measure of labor market 
competition, and other area controls as was done earlier for the static urban wage premium. 
Table 5 reports the results for two specifications of the earnings function, one with only 
worker controls, the other also with employer controls. Panel A reports results where the labor 
market competition variable is omitted. The results are very similar, with a linear term that is 
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increasing in population density and a quadratic term that is decreasing. As it is not so easy to 
interpret these coefficients, the solid line in Figure 5 shows the predicted cumulated wage growth 
at different levels of experience in two labor markets with one being 100 log points denser than 
the other (corresponding to the estimates in Panel A of Table 5). The accumulated urban wage 
growth premium from entering a 100 log points denser labor market and gaining 20 years of work 
experience in this market amounts to about 18 log points. 
As for the urban wage level premium, we next investigate whether this urban wage growth 
premium can be explained by differences in labor market competition. In line with Table 3, Panel 
B of Table 5 presents an OLS regression of the wage growth premium on our measure of labor 
market competition, Panel C the IV estimates (the first stage is the same as in Table 3), and Panel 
D the reduced form. In the IV specification, higher labor market competition is estimated to 
increase both the linear and quadratic terms though the estimated coefficients are not significantly 
different from zero. However, the coefficients on log population density in Panels C and D are 
smaller than those in Panel A. The dashed line in Figure 5 shows that the urban wage growth 
premium after 20 years is about halved when a control for labor market competition is introduced. 
V.   Robustness Checks 
To scrutinize our results further, we perform several checks of robustness along three 
dimensions. The results are presented in Table 6 where the first column is the coefficient on log 
population density in a regression where the dependent variable is the labor supply elasticity (akin 
to Model II in Table 2), the second column is the coefficient on log population density in a 
regression where the dependent variable is the urban wage premium and no competition control is 
included (akin to Model IV in Table 3, Panel A), the third column is the coefficient on log 
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population density when a competition control is included (akin to Model IV in Table 3, Panel C), 
and the fourth column is the coefficient on the instrumented labor supply elasticity in the same 
regression. 
The first row in Table 6 shows the baseline estimates as previously reported. The second 
through fifth rows then repeat our analysis using different measures of agglomeration in the 
second-step regressions: the log population density at the beginning and end of our sample period, 
including log population and log area as separate regressors, and using employment rather than 
population density. The results are very similar for all measures. 
The sixth row repeats our analysis including top-coded wage observations which we impute 
using a heteroskedastic single imputation approach developed by Büttner and Rässler (2008) for 
our data. We do so because top coding occurs at the contribution limit to the German social security 
system that is the same for all workers and thus independent of job location. As a consequence, 
top coding has a stronger bite in denser labor markets with higher wage levels, which may arouse 
some concerns. Results are very similar. 
Finally, the seventh row reestimates the model using a different instrument for the 
estimated labor supply elasticity. We use the measure of search frictions suggested by van den 
Berg and van Vuuren (2010), namely the local share of job exits into nonemployment (as opposed 
to employment). Like the share of hires from nonemployment used in our baseline specification, 
the share of job exits into nonemployment captures how hard it is for workers to move their way 
up in the local wage distribution by job-to-job moves. The final row of Table 6 shows this has little 
impact on the results. 
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VI.   Conclusions 
Using administrative linked employer–employee data for West Germany comprising the 
years 1985–2010, we have presented evidence that part of the urban wage level and growth 
premium stems from greater competition in thick local labor markets. In the first part of our 
analysis, we documented that the wage elasticity of the labor supply to the firm, which governs 
what part of the marginal product of labor accrues to workers in monopsonistic labor markets with 
employer wage setting, is significantly larger in denser markets. The estimated average elasticity 
across local labor markets in most specifications is about 2.3 with an increase in population density 
by 100 log points coming along with an increase in the elasticity by about 0.15–0.19. 
In the second part of our analysis, we found that a 100 log points increase in population 
density is associated with 2.8–3.0 percent higher wages when controlling for worker fixed effects 
and several worker, employer, and local labor market characteristics. However, once we 
conditioned on our measure of labor market competition, this effect was reduced by about 40 
percent. We also found that more competitive labor markets have higher wages. 
Our findings are in line with the notion that a substantial part, though not all, of the urban 
wage premium derives from fiercer competition in thick labor markets. Our results therefore 
suggest that workers in denser labor markets not only obtain higher wages because worker 
productivity is greater and grows at higher pace there but because they also receive a larger share 
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Appendix: The Burdett–Mortensen Model 
This appendix briefly summarizes some aspects of the Burdett–Mortensen (1998) model 
that are used in the main text along the lines of Manning (2003, Chapter 2) where formal 
derivations can be found. 
The marginal product of labor in all firms is 𝑝, and the utility from being nonemployed is 
𝑏. Employers post wages to maximize steady-state profits. Job offers, randomly drawn from 
employers, arrive at a rate 𝜆 for both nonemployed and employed workers. Employed workers lose 
their jobs at a rate 𝛿. The ratio 𝑘 𝜆/𝛿 is a measure of the competitiveness of the labor market. 
Burdett and Mortensen (1998)—see also Manning (2003)—show that the average wage in 





so that more competitive markets (those with a higher value of 𝑘) have higher wages conditional 
on the level of productivity. This also means that, conditional on 𝑏, 𝑝 , a higher value of 𝑘 must 
be associated with a higher average labor supply elasticity to the firm. 
Manning (2003) also shows that the share of hires from nonemployment is given by: 
𝑘
1 𝑘 log 1 𝑘
, 
which can be shown to be a decreasing function of the measure of competitiveness, 𝑘. This 
demonstrates that a single measure of competitiveness is associated with the level of wages, the 








Local Labor Markets in West Germany and Average Population Density by Quintile 
 
Notes: This figure shows the 103 West German local labor markets in our sample and their time-averaged population 
density (that is population per square kilometer averaged over the years 1985–2010) by quintile along with large cities 







Local Labor Supply Elasticities to the Firm and Log Population Density  
 







Local Average Wages and Log Population Density  
 





Figure 4  
 
Local Labor Supply Elasticities to the Firm and Share of Hires from Nonemployment  
 







Accumulated Urban Wage Growth Premium over Workers’ Real Work Experience 
 
Notes: The figure shows the additional log wage growth in a 100 log points denser local labor market over workers’ 
real work experience (based on the estimates of Model II in Table 5, Panels A and C). The solid line shows the 
accumulated wage growth when conditioning on worker, employer, and local labor market characteristics (estimates 
from Panel A). The dashed line shows the accumulated wage growth when additionally conditioning on the labor 






Descriptive Statistics (Means) 
 
 
Log gross daily wage 4.366 
Immigrant (dummy)  0.142 
Low-skilled (dummy)  0.129 
Medium-skilled (dummy)  0.796 
High-skilled (dummy)  0.076 
Experience (years) 9.506 
Tenure (years) 3.534 
Plant size below 11 (dummy) 0.156 
Plant size 11–50 (dummy) 0.251 
Plant size 51–200 (dummy) 0.244 
Plant size 201–1000 (dummy) 0.213 
Plant size above 1000 (dummy) 0.136 
Share of low-skilled workers  0.201 
Share of medium-skilled workers  0.613 
Share of high-skilled workers  0.059 
Share of female workers  0.169 
Share of foreign workers  0.098 
Share of part-time workers  0.117 
Observations (quarterly job spells) 17,010,740 
 
 












(103 local labor markets) 
Model I 
Cox model with 
worker but without 
employer controls  
Model II 




Cox model with 
worker and employer 
controls and plant 
wage effects 
Model IV 
Cox model with worker 
and employer controls and 
deviating wage from plant 
wage effect 
Log population density 0.1879 0.1486 0.1490 0.0942 
 (0.0694) (0.0658) (0.0663) (0.0241) 
Constant 2.4277 2.2201 2.3771 1.4726 
 (0.0429) (0.0392) (0.0390) (0.0148) 
 
 
Notes: IEB and BHP, 1985–2010. Estimates show the second-step regression (Equation 5). The dependent variable is the estimated wage elasticity of the labor 
supply to the firm obtained from the first-step separation equation (Equation 4), which we model as a Cox model with a worker–region-specific baseline hazard. 
Further region controls are the shares of low-skilled and high-skilled workers, the log employment share of the largest two-digit industry, and the log Herfindahl 
index of employment at industry level where all second-step regressors are centered around their means. In the Cox model, worker controls consist of real experience 
(linearly and squared) as well as groups of dummies for education, one-digit occupation, and non-German nationality. Employer controls are the shares of part-
time, high-skilled, low-skilled, female, and non-German workers among the plant’s workforce as well as groups of dummies for plant size and two-digit industry. 
We also add time dummies. In Model III, we further include the plant wage effect from Card, Heining, and Kline (2015) interacted with its reference period. In 












Second-step results (103 local labor markets) 
Model I 
OLS with worker 
controls 
Model II 




FE with worker 
controls 
Model IV 
FE with worker 
and employer 
controls 
Panel A: Not conditioning on the labor supply elasticity 
Log population density 0.0316 0.0360 0.0304 0.0283 
 (0.0081) (0.0073) (0.0053) (0.0050) 
Panel B: Conditioning on the labor supply elasticity  
Log population density 0.0240 0.0319 0.0254 0.0257 
 (0.0096) (0.0084) (0.0062) (0.0058) 
Labor supply elasticity  0.0276 0.0151 0.0180 0.0098 
 (0.0079) (0.0064) (0.0056) (0.0049) 
Panel C: Conditioning on the labor supply elasticity instrumented with the share of hires from nonemployment 
Log population density 0.0161 0.0209 0.0173 0.0181 
 (0.0092) (0.0090) (0.0067) (0.0061) 
Labor supply elasticity  0.0566 0.0549 0.0475 0.0374 
 (0.0155) (0.0158) (0.0109) (0.0103) 
Panel D: Conditioning on the share of hires from nonemployment (reduced form) 
Log population density 0.0097 0.0147 0.0119 0.0138 
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 (0.0074) (0.0064) (0.0049) (0.0047) 
Share of hires from nonemployment –0.5556 –0.5391 –0.4664 –0.3673 
 (0.1017) (0.0885) (0.0790) (0.0683) 
 
 
Notes: IEB and BHP, 1985–2010. Coefficients from second-step regressions as in Equations 7 and 8. The dependent variable is the local wage level obtained from 
the first-step wage regression (Equation 6). The labor supply elasticity is estimated using Model II from Table 2. The F statistic of the first-stage regression for 
Panel C is 23.38. Further region controls are the shares of low-skilled and high-skilled workers, the log employment share of the largest two-digit industry, the log 
Herfindahl index of employment at industry level, and the unemployment rate where all second-step regressors are centered around their means. In the first-step 
wage equation, worker controls consist of real experience (linearly and squared) as well as groups of dummies for education, tenure, one-digit occupation, and non-
German nationality. Employer controls are the shares of part-time, high-skilled, low-skilled, female, and non-German workers among the plant’s workforce as well 










Second-step results (103 local labor markets) 
Model V 
FD with worker 
controls 
Model VI 
FD with worker and 
employer controls 
Panel A: Not conditioning on the labor supply elasticity 
Log population density 0.0224 0.0239 
 (0.0025) (0.0023) 
Panel B: Conditioning on the labor supply elasticity  
Log population density 0.0192 0.0222 
 (0.0061) (0.0061) 
Labor supply elasticity  0.0116 0.0064 
 (0.0063) (0.0057) 
Panel C: Conditioning on the labor supply elasticity instrumented with the share of hires 
from nonemployment  
Log population density 0.0103 0.0140 
 (0.0067) (0.0062) 
Labor supply elasticity 0.0443 0.0364 
 (0.0118) (0.0109) 
Panel D: Conditioning on the share of hires from nonemployment (reduced form) 
Log population density 0.0052 0.0098 
 (0.0028) (0.0027) 
Share of hires from nonemployment –0.4345 –0.3571 
 (0.0573) (0.0540) 
 
 
Notes: IEB and BHP, 1985–2010. Coefficients from second-step regressions as in Equations 7 and 8. The dependent 
variable is the local wage level obtained from the first-step wage regression (Equation 6) in first differences. The labor 
supply elasticity is estimated using Model II from Table 2. The F statistic of the first-stage regression for Panel C is 
23.38. Further region controls are the shares of low-skilled and high-skilled workers, the log employment share of the 
largest two-digit industry, the log Herfindahl index of employment at industry level, and the unemployment rate where 
all second-step regressors are centered around their means. In the first-step wage equation, worker controls consist of 
real experience (linearly and squared) as well as groups of dummies for education, tenure, one-digit occupation, and 
non-German nationality. Employer controls are the shares of part-time, high-skilled, low-skilled, female, and non-
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German workers among the plant’s workforce as well as groups of dummies for plant size and two-digit industry. We 





Local Differences in Experience–Wage Profiles 
 
 
First-step specification Model I 
FE with worker 
controls 
Model II 
FE with worker and 
employer controls 
Component of wage profile 





Panel A: Not conditioning on local search frictions 
Log population density 0.0012 –0.0023 0.0011 –0.0020 
 (0.0004) (0.0015) (0.0004) (0.0014) 
Panel B: Conditioning on the labor supply elasticity 
Log population density 0.0017 –0.0042 0.0017 –0.0036 
 (0.0006) (0.0018) (0.0006) (0.0018) 
Labor supply elasticity –0.0020 0.0070 –0.0019 0.0058 
 (0.0008) (0.0026) (0.0008) (0.0025) 
Panel C: Conditioning on the labor supply elasticity instrumented with the share of hires from 
nonemployment 
Log population density 0.0009 –0.0029 0.0008 –0.0025 
 (0.0007) (0.0020) (0.0007) (0.0021) 
Labor supply elasticity 0.0012 0.0022 0.0012 0.0019 
 (0.0014) (0.0040) (0.0014) (0.0040) 
Panel D: Conditioning on the share of hires from nonemployment (reduced form) 
Log population density 0.0007 –0.0031 0.0007 –0.0027 
 (0.0007) (0.0025) (0.0007) (0.0025) 
Share of hires from nonemployment –0.0117 –0.0219 –0.0117 –0.0188 
 (0.0132) (0.0422) (0.0125) (0.0422) 
 
 
Notes: IEB and BHP, 1985–2010. Coefficients from second-step regressions as in Equations 7 and 8. The dependent 
variables are the region-specific coefficients of real experience and its square (times 100), respectively, obtained from 
a first-step wage regression akin to Equation 6 including worker–region fixed effects. The labor supply elasticity is 
estimated using Model II from Table 2. The F statistic of the first-stage regression for Panel C is 23.38. Further region 
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controls are the shares of low-skilled and high-skilled workers, the log employment share of the largest two-digit 
industry, the log Herfindahl index of employment at industry level, and the unemployment rate where all second-step 
regressors are centered around their means. In the first-step wage equation, worker controls consist of real experience 
(linearly and squared) as well as groups of dummies for education, tenure, one-digit occupation, and non-German 
nationality. Employer controls are the shares of part-time, high-skilled, low-skilled, female, and non-German workers 
among the plant’s workforce as well as groups of dummies for plant size and two-digit industry. We also add year 





Checks of robustness with employer characteristics in the first-step regressions 
 
 




Check of robustness  





the labor supply 
elasticity 
Log agglomeration 
measure in regression 
for the urban wage 
premium when not 
conditioning on the 
labor supply elasticity 
Log agglomeration 
measure in regression 
for the urban wage 
premium when 
conditioning on the 
labor supply elasticity 
Labor supply 
elasticity in 




Baseline 0.1486 0.0283 0.0181 0.0374 
 (0.0658) (0.0050) (0.0061) (0.0103) 
Alternative agglomeration measures     
 Log population density in 1985 0.1325 0.0276 0.0177 0.0381 
 (0.0632) (0.0048) (0.0058) (0.0105) 
 Log population density in 2010 0.1530 0.0289 0.0191 0.0364 
 (0.0698) (0.0051) (0.0063) (0.0098) 
 Log population (controlling for 
 log area separately) 
0.1397 0.0308 0.0213 0.0357 
(0.0895) (0.0056) (0.0070) (0.0094) 
 Log employment density 0.1612 0.0266 0.0164 0.0383 
 (0.0745) (0.0044) (0.0057) (0.0109) 
Including imputed wage observations 0.1481 0.0266 0.0162 0.0387 
 (0.0646) (0.0048) (0.0063) (0.111) 
42 
Using share of job exits into 
nonemployment as instrument 
0.1486 0.0283 0.0185 0.0358 
(0.0658) (0.0050) (0.0059) (0.0100) 
 
 
Notes: IEB and BHP, 1985–2010. The first column shows the coefficient of the agglomeration measure in the second-step regression (Equation 5) where the first-
step separation equation includes worker controls, employer controls, and a worker–region-specific baseline hazard—akin to Model II in Table 2. The second 
column gives the estimated urban wage premium when not conditioning on the labor supply elasticity as in Equation 7 where the first-step wage equation includes 
worker controls and fixed effects as well as employer controls—akin to Model IV in Table 3. The last two columns present the corresponding estimates when 
conditioning on the labor supply elasticity as in Equation 8 where we instrument the elasticity as in Panel C of Table 3. In the final row, we use the share of job 
exits into nonemployment as instrumental variable; the F statistic of the first-stage regression underlying this row is 22.77. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Appendix Table 1 
 
First-Stage Regression for the Labor Supply Elasticity to the Firm 
 
 
Variable (103 local labor markets)  
Share of hires from nonemployment –9.813 
 (2.029) 
Log population density –0.1136 
 (0.1029) 
Share of low-skilled workers 0.5529 
 (1.574) 
Share of high-skilled workers –4.893 
 (3.174) 
Log Herfindahl index of employment –0.1766 
 (0.6505) 
Log employment share of the largest industry 0.3067 
 (0.4490) 




Notes: IEB, BHP, and official statistics, 1985–2010. Time-averages over years. Results of the first-stage regression 
underlying the IV estimates that instrument the labor supply elasticity to the firm with the share of hires from 




1 See, for instance, Hirsch, Jahn, and Schnabel (2018) for a comparison to the Socio-Economic 
Panel that includes workers who are not registered with the German social security system. 
2 Note that in our data plant identifiers change in some cases for administrative reasons, such as 
mergers of plants, spin-offs, etc. To avoid the impact of changing plant identifiers on worker 
transitions and job durations, we drop all jobs subject to spurious changes in plant identifiers as 
identified in Hethey-Maier and Schmieder (2013). 
3 This assumption of employer wage setting is in line with existing evidence for Germany 
documenting that wage posting is the predominant form of wage formation (Brenzel, Gartner, and 
Schnabel 2014). 
4 One rare exception is Falch (2017), who is able to analyze data on employers’ recruitment pools 
for certified teachers in Norway and finds substantial monopsony power in this labor market 
segment. Reassuringly, his estimates of the firm-level labor supply elasticity are of the same 
magnitude as in an earlier study (Falch, 2011) that uses the same data but rests on the approach 
based on workers’ job separation rate that we will use, thereby validating the finding of studies 
lacking such data on employers’ recruitment pools. 
5 Some previous studies, such as Booth and Katic (2011) and Hirsch, Jahn, and Schnabel (2018), 
applied a more sophisticated estimation approach distinguishing employment and nonemployment 
as distinct labor market states. Although our data include information on workers’ previous and 
subsequent labor market states, distinguishing transitions from and to employment from those from 
and to nonemployment is not viable in our application because of the limited number of jobs 
observed in sparsely populated local labor markets. 
6 Note that by allowing for a worker–region-specific baseline hazard the proportionality 
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assumption inherent to the class of hazard rate models defined by Equation 4 needs to hold only 
for jobs held by the same worker within a particular local labor market, but may well be violated 
across workers or regions without invalidating identification (Kalbfleisch and Prentice 2002: 118–
9). 
7 Low-skilled workers are workers with neither a vocational nor an academic degree whereas 
medium-skilled workers possess a vocational degree and high-skilled workers have an academic 
degree. 
8 Note that we do not correct workers’ wages for differences in local labor markets’ price levels 
because we are interested in the part of the urban wage premium that reflects workers’ marginal 
productivity rather than differences in local price levels. As stressed by Heuermann, Halfdanarson, 
and Suedekum (2010: 752), “[t]he fundamental point in the debate on whether to use nominal or 
real wages is that, while spatial differences in nominal wages can be interpreted as productivity 
differences, regional differences in real wages reflect differences in workers’ utility rooted in urban 
amenities.” See Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009), Moretti (2011), and Combes and Gobillon (2015) for 
similar assessments. 
9 One potential problem with this strategy is that switching locations may itself be endogenous. 
Hence, estimated regional wage levels may suffer from bias if worker unobservables and location 
changes are not orthogonal as is implicitly assumed when applying the fixed-effects approach. 
Instrumenting workers’ location has proven difficult due to the lack of credible, strong instruments 
(Heuermann, Halfdanarson, and Suedekum 2010) and has, in general, also made no big difference 
(Melo, Graham, and Noland 2009). Another approach chosen in previous studies is to model 
worker mobility explicitly in a structural setting (Gould 2007; Baum-Snow and Pavan 2012). This 
structural approach, though, comes at the cost of strong functional assumptions and of excluding 
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worker fixed effects from the wage equations.  
10 Manning (2020) discusses the growing literature on how to measure competition in labor 
markets with most studies using concentration ratios. However, in the Burdett–Mortensen model, 
greater competition is associated with higher concentration ratios, a problem also pointed out by 
Syverson (2019) in the context of product markets. 
11 In Section V, we demonstrate that we obtain the same results when using an alternative measure 
of search frictions proposed by van den Berg and van Vuuren (2010). 
12 Note that the worker–region fixed effects further control for the worker’s previous (time-
invariant) work experience gained in other local labor markets. Hence, our approach is very similar 
in spirit to De la Roca and Puga’s (2017), as is our finding that work experience gained in denser 
labor markets gives rise to more pronounced wage growth. One possible concern, however, is that 
workers who repeatedly move between the same regions and who therefore gain work experience 
within a local labor market at different points of time in their careers may blur our estimates. To 
rule this out, we redid our analysis for stayers, who do not change regions at all. Reassuringly, this 
had no impact on our findings. 
